Kathmandu [Nepal], Nov 19 – Nepal Prime Minister Balendra Shah’s forthcoming visit to India is going to be a real breakthrough for Nepal but it will also be a far more familiar diplomatic challenge in that it will be about how to go about forging economic co-operation with India without allowing the unresolved issues of territorial sovereignty to simply vanish from the agenda.
On November 22–23, Shah is scheduled to undertake his first bilateral state visit to India since assuming office in March 2026. His meetings with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi are expected to focus on economic assistance, air connectivity, infrastructure development, energy cooperation and other bilateral priorities. Nepal is also seeking an economic package of approximately $2 billion, primarily for post-disaster reconstruction and development.
These priorities matter for a country struggling with structural economic vulnerabilities and infrastructure constraints. Yet the visit comes at a particularly sensitive moment in Nepal’s relations with both its neighbors. The territorial dispute surrounding Lipulekh, Kalapani and Limpiyadhura remains unresolved while India and China continue to pursue their respective strategic and commercial interests in the Himalayan region without engaging Nepal.
The central question, therefore is whether Kathmandu will approach this visit as an opportunity to strengthen its independent diplomatic position, dropping the “old baggage” as referred by the foreign minister, Shishir Khanal or allow immediate economic interests to overshadow its longer-term sovereignty concerns. The distinction matters.
On August 1, 2026, Indian traders crossed the Lipulekh Pass into Tibet as India and China resumed border trade through the strategically important route. Nepal maintains that Lipulekh falls within its territory and lodged a formal diplomatic protest in May 2026. Yet neither capital altered its position or suspended the commercial arrangement following Kathmandu’s objection.
The episode exposes an uncomfortable reality. When two larger powers find common ground in an arrangement affecting Nepal’s territorial claims, Kathmandu’s diplomatic objections alone carry limited weight.
The upcoming visit to New Delhi should therefore be understood within this wider geopolitical context. Nepal needs India but economic dependence must not become diplomatic submission. Equally, maintaining relations with China must not be mistaken for securing Chinese support on Nepal’s territorial claims. Nepal’s interests require something more deliberate: strategic autonomy supported by institutional strength, economic diversification and consistent diplomacy.
The arithmetic of dependence
The economic relationship between Nepal and India explains much of Kathmandu’s diplomatic vulnerability.
India accounts for more than 64 percent of Nepal’s total trade. Bilateral trade reached approximately $8.7 billion in fiscal year 2024/25. India supplies roughly 60 percent of Nepal’s imports, absorbs nearly 68 percent of its exports and remains a major source of foreign investment.
Nepal’s dependence extends beyond merchandise trade. Its landlocked geography makes access to Indian ports and transit infrastructure essential for international commerce. Remittances contribute approximately one-fifth to one-quarter of GDP while the country’s limited industrial and export capacity continues to constrain its economic choices. The trade imbalance illustrates the problem. Nepal’s merchandise trade deficit reached approximately Rs 1,527 billion in FY 2024/25 with exports covering only 15.4 percent of imports.
A country that imports six to seven times what it exports enters bilateral negotiations with limited economic leverage.
Recent trade patterns reinforce this structural reality. Nepal’s exports to India increased by 117.8 percent in FY 2024/25, compared with a 1.6 percent increase in exports to China. Although the Indian growth figure reflects particular commodity categories including edible oil, the broader pattern remains clear. Nepal’s economic geography continues to pull southward.
China offers an alternative in infrastructure, investment and connectivity. Nepal joined the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2017 and the proposed trans-Himalayan connectivity network has strategic significance. However, geographical constraints, high infrastructure costs and the practical limitations of cross-border connectivity mean that Chinese alternatives cannot quickly replace Nepal’s existing dependence on India.
This is the economic reality Shah must navigate in New Delhi. Seeking Indian investment, development assistance and improved connectivity is consistent with Nepal’s national interests. The challenge is ensuring that economic cooperation does not become a substitute for addressing unresolved political and territorial questions.
The myth of the patron
One recurring assumption in Nepali political discourse is that China can serve as a strategic counterweight to India and consequently provide diplomatic support for Nepal’s territorial claims.
However, the record offers little evidence for such an expectation. During Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in August 2025, Oli raised Nepal’s objections concerning Lipulekh. Xi reportedly expressed no differing view regarding Nepal’s position but maintained that Nepal and India should resolve the issue bilaterally. That response was diplomatically courteous but strategically non-committal.
It followed China’s 2023 official map, which depicted Lipulekh, Kalapani and Limpiyadhura as part of India. The episode demonstrated that Beijing’s strategic relationship with New Delhi can take precedence over Kathmandu’s expectations of diplomatic support.
Nepal should therefore avoid confusing Chinese economic engagement with a commitment to defend Nepal’s sovereignty.
The opposite assumption is equally problematic. Accommodation with India has not resolved Nepal’s territorial disagreements. The 2015 blockade, India’s 2019 political map and the subsequent 2020 inauguration of a road through the disputed territory demonstrate the limitations of relying on goodwill alone. India rejected Nepal’s objections to its territorial claims, describing them as unjustified and unsupported by historical facts. Nepal’s repeated diplomatic protests have yet to produce a mutually accepted resolution.
The lesson is not that Nepal should distance itself from either neighbor. It is that neither neighbor has an obligation to advance Nepal’s national interests when doing so conflicts with its own strategic calculations. Small-state diplomacy requires an understanding of this distinction.
Balen Shah’s diplomatic test
The November visit offers Shah an opportunity to establish the principles guiding Nepal’s foreign policy under his government.
His administration faces competing expectations. The private sector wants economic diplomacy, improved market access and greater Indian investment. Infrastructure planners seek additional air-entry routes, energy cooperation and transit connectivity. Meanwhile, public expectations surrounding national sovereignty remain deeply rooted in Nepal’s political consciousness.
The reported agenda reflects these competing priorities. Nepal is seeking approximately $2 billion in financial assistance for reconstruction following the August 2026 floods. Additional air-entry routes through Indian airspace particularly Mahendranagar and Bhairahawa are also high on the agenda. Several India-supported infrastructure projects are expected to be inaugurated or advanced. India’s request to permit Nepal airspace for strategic Bagdogra airport has created the stir. Given the scope of visit of the PM, the boundary dispute, trade imbalance, transit arrangements and the stalled Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project are unlikely to achieve substantive progress during the shortened visit. More concerning is the reported absence of a clear boundary discussion during Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s preparatory meetings in Kathmandu.
If the territorial question remains outside the substantive discussions between the two prime ministers, the visit risks reinforcing a familiar pattern: economic cooperation advances while sovereignty concerns remain unresolved. Shah should not approach the meeting with unrealistic expectations of an immediate territorial settlement nor should he allow the short duration of the visit to become an excuse for avoiding difficult subjects.
A clear diplomatic position matters. Nepal should formally request that the boundary question remain part of the bilateral agenda and that both sides agree to a structured process for resolving outstanding differences. There is also a domestic dimension. Shah’s previous political positions on India including his symbolic use of the Greater Nepal map during his mayoral tenure have contributed to public expectations regarding his approach to territorial sovereignty. His subsequent remarks in May 2026, acknowledging that Nepal too had encroached upon Indian territory, introduced a different dimension to the debate.
Such statements should lead to evidence-based boundary discussions rather than political posturing. Historical documents, administrative records, maps, and established international legal principles must guide Nepal’s position.
The measure of diplomatic consistency is not the intensity of rhetoric. It is the government’s willingness to pursue its claims through credible institutions and sustained negotiations.
The realist objection
Critics may argue that Nepal has limited leverage against two much larger neighbors. If neither India nor China is prepared to champion Nepal’s territorial position, why continue pressing the issue? The answer is straightforward. Silence is not neutrality and diplomatic inaction is not a substitute for strategic restraint.
Territorial claims demand ongoing institutional attention. Preservation of historical documents, systematic compilation of administrative evidence, formal recording of diplomatic objections and consistent application of international legal principles are essential. Claims that remain unasserted or insufficiently documented over extended periods become increasingly challenging to defend diplomatically. Simultaneously, Nepal must acknowledge the constraints of its geopolitical position. It cannot compel India or China to accept its territorial interpretation through rhetoric, public demonstrations, or symbolic gestures.
The realistic approach is neither escalation nor concession. It is a sustained effort to strengthen Nepal’s diplomatic, economic and institutional capacity.
Nepal’s geographical position between two major powers is often described as a strategic disadvantage. Yet its stability also matters to both neighbors. A predictable, sovereign and economically viable Nepal contributes to regional stability and security.
From diplomatic symbolism to institutional strategy
Nepal needs a coherent foreign policy built around four interconnected priorities.
First, institutionalize boundary negotiations. Nepal and India already have established boundary mechanisms including the Boundary Working Group. Nepal should insist on regular meetings, clear mandates and measurable progress. Technical discussions must continue independently of changes in political leadership. The same institutional discipline should apply to Nepal’s boundary mechanisms with China. Border concerns in northern districts deserve systematic documentation and diplomatic engagement, just as Nepal’s claims in the western sector require sustained attention.
Second, establish a credible mechanism for trilateral consultation. Lipulekh is strategically sensitive because it involves the interests of Nepal, India and China. Nepal should press for a trilateral technical consultation mechanism wherever an arrangement affects the interests or territorial claims of all three countries. Bilateral agreements between two countries should not be treated as sufficient grounds to settle or prejudge a third country’s territorial claim. Such a mechanism will not automatically resolve the dispute. It would, however, create a diplomatic process through which Nepal’s position receives formal consideration.
Third, pursue economic diversification without creating another dependency. Nepal should expand its access to third-country markets, improve domestic production capacity, strengthen regional connectivity, and pursue commercially viable infrastructure projects. BIMSTEC, Bangladesh’s growing energy market, and alternative trade and transit arrangements offer opportunities to reduce economic vulnerability. Long-term electricity trade with India also creates mutual economic interests that can support a more balanced relationship. The objective should be greater economic resilience, not replacing dependence on one neighbor with dependence on another.
Fourth, maintain consistency in relations with both neighbors. Kathmandu’s diplomatic credibility suffers when it raises territorial concerns selectively. Any credible reports of encroachment or boundary violations, whether involving India or China, deserve the same institutional seriousness.
Nepal should avoid allowing domestic political competition to determine the intensity of its foreign policy. Territorial sovereignty is a national interest, not an instrument of party politics.
Neither patron nor proxy
There is a persistent belief in Nepali politics that the country can extract strategic advantage by playing India against China. The assumption is attractive because it appears to offer a relatively inexpensive way of balancing two powerful neighbors.
In practice, it carries considerable risks. India and China have their own strategic calculations, economic priorities, and bilateral interests. Neither is likely to subordinate those interests to Nepal’s expectations. Their cooperation on the Lipulekh trade route, despite Nepal’s formal objections, illustrates the limits of Kathmandu’s influence when it relies primarily on diplomatic appeals. Nepal’s foreign policy must therefore move beyond the politics of choosing sides.
Balen Shah’s forthcoming visit to India should be an exercise in practical diplomacy. Nepal should pursue economic assistance, investment, energy cooperation, improved air connectivity and infrastructure development. At the same time, it should clearly articulate its territorial position and seek a structured mechanism for addressing outstanding disputes.
A successful visit should not be measured solely by the financial assistance secured or the number of agreements signed. It should also be assessed by whether Nepal succeeds in placing its long-term national interests within the framework of its bilateral relationship. The larger strategic objective is to build a Nepal that neither India nor China can reasonably regard as a proxy of the other. Nepal cannot change its geography. It can, however, change how it manages the political and economic consequences of that geography.
The choice before Kathmandu is not between India and China. It is between a foreign policy driven by immediate political convenience and one anchored in national interest, institutional consistency and strategic autonomy.
Neither patronage nor proxy politics will resolve Nepal’s foreign policy. Only a sustained, evidence-based and even-handed diplomatic strategy offers a credible path forward to bilateral or multilateral issues.
Disclaimer: Durga Kunwar is a public policy expert educated at George Mason University and a country risk analyst certified by Cornell University. A former senior law-enforcement official from Nepal, he brings more than two decades of experience in security, governance, and public policy. He is also a Human Rights Consultant affiliated with the United States Institute of Diplomacy and Human Rights. He writes on democracy, security-sector reform, international relations, and South Asian politics, with a particular focus on governance, political transformation, emerging security challenges, and the intersection of technology and society. The views and opinions expressed are solely his own and do not represent those of any institution or organization with which he is affiliated.